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Abstract 
We use a microfounded dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with 
banks to study interactions between monetary and macroprudential policies in a small 
open economy. The model is calibrated/estimated for Korea. Cooperation of monetary 
and macroprudential policies is optimal under a financial shock. Prolonged periods of 
monetary accommodation lead to inflationary pressures, lower the effectiveness of 
macroprudential instrument (loan-to-value ratio) and contribute to further credit growth, 
increasing vulnerabilities. 
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1. Introduction  
At least since the outbreak of the Great Recession and the financial crisis of 2008-2009 
“we are all macroprudentialists now”,  as it was broadly realized that existing set of macro 
stabilization policies targeting price stability and economic growth and microprudential 
regulation aimed at financial soundness of individual banking institutions were not enough to 
ensure financial stability. The set of macroprudential policy tools, recently being discussed and 
introduced in many advanced economies, is supposed to fill this gap2.  
These new policies, once introduced, will inevitably interact with other macro 
stabilization policies, especially monetary policy, since very similar variables are affected: real 
activity, credit growth, and inflation. And there is room for both potential complementarities and 
conflicts between monetary and macroprudential policies. Raising monetary policy interest rate 
might eventually lead to a reduction of credit (via the broad credit channel), which will also 
happen when a macroprudential tool (e.g. in the form of tightening of debt-to-income or loan-to-
value ratios) is employed. Noteworthy, though, monetary policy has a very broad tool applied to 
the whole economy and monetary tightening might create a recession in order to achieve a given 
reduction in excessive credit in some sector, whereas macroprudential policy can be more 
targeted, applying to certain sectors e.g. mortgage lending only. This argument favors the use of 
macroprudential tools. However, little is known about the welfare costs, macroprudential 
interventions have for the economy, since they often lead to credit rationing. In this respect, 
monetary policy intervention might appear less distrortionary. 
Conflicts between the policies are very likely to arise, when their objectives move into the 
opposite directions and there is no policy coordination. For instance, when monetary policy reacts 
to an adverse shock by easing the interest rate, it may contribute to an increase in credit growth 
and therefore trigger a tightening reaction on the macroprudential side. This, in turn, calls for 
another round of monetary easing followed by macroprudential tightening, which would only 
have an end, when monetary policy has reached the zero lower bound. This “push-me-pull-you” 
game between monetary and macroprudential authorities clearly leads to suboptimal outcomes 
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 See Lim et al. 2011 for an extensive overview of macroprudential instruments and country experiences in 
implementing them. 
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for the economy (monetary policy brought to its lower bound, high volatility of macro 
aggregates, large interventions and distortions in financial markets); this example furthermore 
stresses the importance of institutional policy design, in particular coordination mechanisms 
between monetary and macroprudential authorities. In this paper we would like to study these 
questions in a theoretical dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, focusing on the example 
of Korea. 
We focus our attention on Korea for two reasons. First, Korea is one of the few countries 
that have been at the forefront of macroprudential policy (MaPP) implementation, even before 
the global crisis put macroprudential tools at the center stage of macrofinancial policy 
discussions.  Korea’s use of macroprudential tools began in 2002 to address the fast increase in 
housing prices through loan-to-value ratios (LTV). Since then Korean authorities made extensive 
use of these tools along with other measures that included debt-to-income (DTI) limits since 
2005, and ranged from supply side measures, to tax incentives/disincentives and direct support to 
the construction sector, to address perceived excesses in the housing market.  
Second, the set of financial vulnerabilities to be addressed in Korea is quite challenging, 
but also typical for many small open economies and requires careful analysis of available policy 
options. In particular, despite active implementation of DTI and LTV policies, the growth of 
mortgages continues at a healthy clip (Figure 1a). Furthermore, mortgage growth appears to be a 
serious policy concern since household debt in Korea is already quite high by OECD standards 
(Figure 1b) and remains exposed to interest rate and rollover risks given the still high share of 
floating rate and bullet structure of mortgage loans (over 90%, see Kim 2012). 
[insert Figure 1] 
Since the Global Recession the Korean government has introduced a multitude of 
additional measures geared towards addressing the key concerns that came to the fore at the 
height of the crisis. These measures were closely linked to the volatility of capital flows that 
Korea  faced starting with a sudden stop at the height of the Great Recession, and the fast pace of 
inflows in 2009  following the rapid recovery in Korea. Currently, Korean banks rely on foreign 
funds less than before the crisis, but banks’ foreign liabilities still remain sizeable (Figures 2a and 
2b) making the banking sector potentially vulnerable to negative external shocks (e.g. downside 
scenarios in Europe, fiscal cliff in the US, and slowdown in China etc.). 
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[insert Figure 2] 
Finally, the case of Korea delivers several motivating examples of interactions between 
monetary and macroprudential policies, posing a question about their potential substitutability. 
As Figure 3 illustrates, the real interest rates were negative in Korea in the period September 
2008 – January 2012, reflecting an accommodative monetary policy stance. At the same time, 
Korean government tightened LTVs, e.g. in July 2009 - for banks - and in October 2009 - for 
non-bank financial institutions (see Igan and Kang (2011) for more details). The question is 
which consequences a combination of relatively lax monetary and tight macroprudential policy 
might have for price and financial stability of the economy and if monetary and macroprudential 
policies can be treated as substitutes under certain conditions. 
[insert Figure 3] 
 We use a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model accounting for the 
outlined financial vulnerabilities relevant for Korea and estimate it to study policy interactions 
and tradeoffs between monetary and macroprudential policies in a small open economy.  
Literature on modeling macroprudential policy is currently growing very fast. In the 
context of a closed economy, Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gerali et al. (2009) models account 
explicitly for bank balance sheet variables and therefore constitute a suitable framework for 
macroprudential policy analysis. Angelini et al. (2011) study interactions between monetary and 
macroprudential policies (capital requirements as well as loan-to-value ratios) using the closed 
economy setup of Gerali et al. (2009). In the open economy context, Unsal (2012) studies capital 
inflow measures and its interactions with monetary policy in a model with demand-sided 
financial friction in a spirit of Bernanke et al. (1999). Funke and Paetz (2012) study the effects of 
nonlinear loan-to-value policies in Hong Kong in a DSGE-model with collateral constraints a lá 
Iacoviello (2005). In many of the open economy studies, however, the banking sector is either 
absent or it is modeled in a rudimentary way. We analyze monetary and macroprudential policies 
in a model with banks. 
As a first step, we build on the setup outlined in Brzoza-Brzezina and Makarski (2011). 
This small open economy model contains housing sector and collateral constraints a lá Iacoviello 
(2005) as well as banking sector of Gerali et al. (2010), whereas banks are allowed to borrow 
from abroad and are subject to external balance sheet shocks. Furthermore, the model 
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incorporates a standard set of nominal and real rigidities (Christiano et al 2005, Smets and 
Wouters 2007), which are important to fit the data. This setup allows for distinct roles for 
monetary and macroprudential policies (see Angelini et al. 2011). The model is estimated for 
Korea with Bayesian techniques (An and Schorfheide 2010). 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model; section 3 
discusses calibrated parameters and the results of Bayesian estimation. Section 4 deals with 
policy exercises under a financial (bank balance sheet) shock, whereas section 5 outlines 
robustness exercises. Section 5 concludes and discusses direction for future work.  
 
 
2. The Model3  
2.1. Households and entrepreneurs 
The economy is populated by impatient households, patient households and 
entrepreneurs. The discount factor of patient households is higher than the discount factor 
of impatient households and entrepreneurs (for simplicity impatient households and 
entrepreneurs have the same discount factor). This assumption implies the simultaneous 
existence of borrowers and lenders in equilibrium. 
2.1.1. Patient Households 
The patient household chooses consumption, stock of housing and deposits. Labor 
supply decision is delegated to the labor union. The expected lifetime utility of a 
patient households is given by: 
11 1
1
0 , , ,
0
( ( ) ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1
c np p p p
t t t t t
p u t t n t
t c n
c i c i n i
E
 


 
   
  
 


 
  
    
 , where 
 stands for the degree of external habit formation and 
,u t , ,t , ,n t are 
intertemporal, housing and preference shocks respectively. Preference shocks are 
modeled as AR(1) processes. The patient household faces the following budget 
constraint: 
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 The model below is a version of Brzoza-Brzezina and Makarski  (2011). 
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, 1 1 1( ) ( ( ) (1 ) ( )) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
P P P H p d H p
t t t t t t t t t t tPc i P i i D i W n i r D i T i              
To finance consumption, housing expenditure and new deposits patient household 
uses his labor income )(inW ptt , interest earned on deposits )()1( 11 iDr
H
t
d
t  and 
dividends less lump sum taxes )(iTpt  . 
In real terms the budget constraint can be written as: 
1 1 1( ) ( ( ) (1 ) ( )) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) / ( ) / /
P h P P p d p
t t t t t t t t t t t t tc i q i i d i w n i r d i T i P P             
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,th
t
t
P
q
P


being real housing price, 
t
t
t
W
w
P

being the real wage, 
( )
( )
H
t
t
t
D i
d i
P

the real deposit. 
Euler equation is standard and reads as: 
1
1
'( ( ))(1 ( ))
'( ( ))
P d
P P t t
t t
t
U c i r i
U c i E



 
  
  . 
From the Euler equation we see that consumption and saving decisions of patient 
households depend on the deposit rate that is set as a mark-up over monetary 
policy rate (see Section 2.2. below).
 
2.1.2. Impatient Households 
An impatient household chooses consumption, the stock of housing and loans 
when maximizing its lifetime utility: 
11 1
1
0 , , ,
0
( ( ) ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1
c ni i i i
t t t t t
i u t t n t
t c n
c i c i n i
E
 


 
   
  
 


 
  
    
 . 
Impatient households face the following budget constraint: 
, 1 1( ) ( ( ) (1 ) ( )) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
i i i bH H i J
t t t t t t t t t tPc i P i i r L i W n i L i T i              . 
In real terms the constraint reads: 
1 1( ) ( ( ) (1 ) ( )) (1 ) ( ) / ( ) ( ) ( ) /
i h i i bH I i I
t t t t t t t t t t tc i q i i r b i w n i b i T i P             
Borrowing constraint is given by: 
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, 1(1 ) ( ) ( (1 ) ( ))
bH H H i
t t t t t tr L i m E P i     , where 
H
tm is loan-to-value ratio and is evolving according to the MaPP rule (see below). 
Borrowing constraint in real terms ( t is the Lagrange multiplier on this 
constraint): 
1 1(1 ) ( ) ( (1 ) ( ))
bH H h i
t t t t t t tr b i m E q i      , where b(i) is real loan to impatient 
household4. 
Euler equation for impatient household is: 
1
1
'( ( ))(1 ( ))
'( ( )) (1 )
I bH
I I bHt t
t t t t
t
U c i r i
U c i E r 



 
   
   
The consumption and saving decision of impatient household depends not just on 
the lending rate (and therefore indirectly on the monetary policy stance); 
macroprudential policy influences this decision separately via the borrowing limit 
constraint. Lowering the LTV ratio tightens the borrowing limit for given 
monetary policy stance.  
2.1.3. Entrepreneurs 
Entrepreneurs draw their utility from consumption only, therefore their expected 
lifetime utility can be written as: 
1
1
0 ,
0
( ( ) )
1
cE E
t t t
E u t
t c
c i c
E

 




 
 
 
 . 
Entrepreneurs produce homogenous intermediate goods according to the 
production technology: 
  1, 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )W t t t t ty i A u i k i n i
 
 , where 
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 Noteworthy, the floating lending rate on mortgages fits the Korean experience particularly well. Unlike some other 
countries, about 93% of mortgages in Korea have variable interest rates (see also Kim 2012). 
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tA  is an exogenous total factor productivity (modeled with an AR(1) process), tu is capital 
utilization rate, tk is capital stock and tn is labor input. Following standard assumptions in the 
literature (see Christiano et al. (2005)), we impose capital adjustment costs 1( )t tu k   with
(1) 0  , '(1) 0  and ''(1) 0  . In order to finance their expenditure on consumption, labor 
services, capital accumulation, capital adjustment costs, repayment of debt, and lump sum taxes 
entrepreneurs use their revenues and new loans, which is reflected in the following budget 
constraint: 
, 1 1
1 1 , ,
( ) ( ) ( ( ) (1 ) ( )) ( ( )) ( )
(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
E
t t t t k t t k t t t t
bE F F
t t W t W t t t
Pc i W n i P k i k i P u i k i
r L i P y i L i T i
  
 
     
    
 
or in real terms: 
, 1 1
,
1 1 ,
( ) ( ) ( ( ) (1 ) ( )) ( ( )) ( )
(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) /
E
t t t k t t k t t t
W tbE E E
t t W t t t t
t
c i w n i q k i k i u i k i
P
r b i y i b i T i P
P
  
 
     
    
 
Similar to impatient households, entrepreneurs face a borrowing constraint: 
, 1(1 ) ( ) ( (1 ) ( ))
bE F F
t t t t k t k tr L i m E P k i   , 
where F
tm is entrepreneurs’ loan-to-value ratio and is specifies as a MaPP policy 
rule (see below). 
Borrowing constraint in real terms: 
, 1 1(1 ) ( ) ( (1 ) ( ))
bE E F
t t t t k t t k tr b i m E q k i      
The model calibration is designed such that borrowing constraint of the entrepreneurs and 
impatient households will bind in steady state. Following the argument of Iacoviello (2005), we 
will assume that under uncertainty the shocks will be small enough and both constraints will still 
be binding in the small neighborhood around the steady state.5 
2.1.4. Labor Supply and Wages 
                                                 
5
 This assumption is not realistic, especially in the face of large shocks, and will be relaxed later on. 
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We assume that each household has a continuum of labor types of measure one and for 
each type there exists a labor union that sets the wages. Both types of households (patient and 
impatient) belong to the labor unions. Labor services are sold to perfectly competitive 
aggregators who pool all the labor types into undifferentiated labor service as follows: 
1
11
1
0
( ) ( )
W
WI P
t tn n h dh

 


 
  
 
 
 , where 
I and P denote the share of impatient and patient households in the population 
respectively. 
This yields a standard condition for the labor demand of type h: 
(1 )
( )1
( )
W
W
t
t tI P
t
W h
n h n
W


 
 
 
  
  
 with 
11
0
( )
W
W
t tW W h dh



 
  
 
 
 . 
The unions discount factor is the weighted average of the discount factors of patient and 
impatient households. The union sets the wage according to the Calvo scheme: with probability 
(1 )W  it receives a signal to reoptimize and sets the wage by maximizing the utility of its 
average member subject to the demand for its labor services. With probability W it sets the wage 
according to: 
1 1( ) ((1 ) ) ( )t W W t tW h W h       , where  
 is steady state inflation and  0,1W  . 
2.2. Financial sector 
As in Gerali et al. 2009, banking activity is divided into several steps. Saving banks 
purchase deposit accounts in the interbank market, brand them and sell to a financial saving 
intermediary, which then sells them as undifferentiated product to households. Lending banks 
take undifferentiated loans in the interbank markets (both domestic and international), brand them 
and sell to financial lending intermediary, which aggregates it into a single loan and offers it to 
households or firms. 
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2.2.1. Financial Intermediaries 
Financial intermediaries operate under perfect competition and act as Dixit-Stiglitz 
aggregators. The optimization problems of financial intermediaries give rise to standard demand 
for banks’ products (deposits and loans to households and entrepreneurs): 
1
,
,
( )
( )
HD
HD
H
D tH H
t tH
D t
R i
D i D
R



 
   
 
 
(1 )
,
,
( )
( )
HL
HL
H
L tH H
t tH
L t
R i
L i L
R


 
 
   
 
 
(1 )
,
,
( )
( )
EL
EL
E
L tE E
t tE
L t
R i
L i L
R


 
 
   
 
6 
2.2.2. Saving Banks 
Saving Banks collect deposits from saving intermediaries and deposit them in the 
interbank market. Following Brzoza-Brzezina and Makarski (2011), we assume that for each unit 
of deposits collected the bank can deposit 
,
H
D tz  units on the interbank market ( ,
H
D tz  follows an 
AR(1) process with mean one): 
, ,( ) ( )
H H H
IB t D t tD i z D i  
Savings banks operate under monopolistic competition and set interest rates according to 
a standard Calvo scheme. Once the banks receive a signal to reoptimize the interest rate (which 
occurs with probability (1 )D ), they maximize: 
 1 , 1 , ,
0
( ) ( ) ( )j j p H H Ht D p t t j t j IB t j D t t j
j
E R D i X i D i 


    

   
subject to deposit demand and the condition on the interbank market above. X denotes the 
optimal interest rate chosen by the bank. 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Notation here:
, 1
H d
D t tR r  and so on. 
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2.2.3. Lending Banks 
Here we describe lending to households, as lending to entrepreneurs is symmetric. 
Lending banks takes loans in the domestic interbank market at the policy rate and in the foreign 
interbank market at the foreign interest rate subject to the risk premium: 
*
exp t tt t
t t
e L
P y
  
 
  
 
,  
where e is nominal exchange rate and L* stands for foreign borrowing. Again, as in Brzoza-
Brzezina and Makarski (2011), we introduce time-varying spreads by assuming: 
,*
, , ,( ) ( ( ) ( ))
H H H H
t L t IB t t IB tL i z L i e L i  . 
Lending banks operate under monopolistic competition and set their interest rates 
according to Calvo scheme. With probability (1 )L  they receive a signal to reoptimize the 
interest rate. The banks maximize  profits 
 1 * ,*, 1 , , 1 ,
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )j j p H H Ht L p t t j L t t j t j IB t j t j t j t j IB t j
j
E X i L i R L i e R L i  


         

    
subject to loan demand and the condition on the interbank market above. 
The optimization of wholesale branch gives rise to the standard UIP condition.  
2.3. Producers 
The model has the following production sectors in the economy: capital goods sector, 
housing goods sector and consumption goods sector. The first two operate under perfect 
competition. In the consumption goods sector we have the entrepreneurs (see above), which sell 
their undifferentiated goods to retailers. Retailers differentiate the goods and sell them to 
domestic and foreign aggregators. Aggregators combine differentiated domestic intermediate 
goods and differentiated foreign intermediate goods into a single final good. 
2.3.1. Capital Goods Producers 
Each period capital goods producer buys 
,k ti  of final consumption goods and old 
undepreciated capital from entrepreneurs. Next capital goods producer transforms it into new 
capital. The technology to produce new capital is given by: 
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,
1 ,
, 1
(1 ) 1
k t
t t k k t
k t
i
k k S i
i
 

  
       
  
. 
The setup is adopted from Christiano et al. (2005). Capital adjustment costs satisfy: 
(1) '(1) 0k kS S   and ''(1) 0kS  . 
2.3.2. Housing Producers 
Housing producers operate similarly to capital goods producers. The stock of housing follows: 
,
1 ,
, 1
(1 ) 1
t
t t t
t
i
S i
i

  

   

  
       
  
, 
where the adjustment cost function also satisfies: (1) '(1) 0S S    and ''(1) 0S  . 
2.3.3. Final Good Producers 
Final good producers buy differentiated goods from domestic retailers 
, ( )H t Hy j and 
importing retailers
, ( )F t Fy j to aggregate them into a single final good and sell on a perfectly 
competitive market. Final good is aggregated according to: 
1
1 11 1
, ,(1 )t H t F ty y y
 
   

  
 
   
  
, where 
1
11
1
, ,
0
( )
H
H
H t H t H Hy y j dj




 
  
  
  
1
11
1
, ,
0
( )
F
F
F t F t F Fy y j dj




 
  
  
 . 
The problem of the CES-aggregator gives rise to standard demand functions for differentiated 
goods: 
(1 )
,
, ,
,
( )
( )
H
H
H t H
H t H H t
H t
P j
y j y
P


 
 
   
 
 and 
(1 )
,
, ,
,
( )
( )
F
F
F t F
F t F F t
F t
P j
y j y
P


 
 
   
 
with 
(1 )
,
, (1 )
F t
F t t
t
P
y y
P



 
 
   
 
 and 
(1 )
,
,
H t
H t t
t
P
y y
P



 
 
  
 
, where 
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 is the home bias parameter. Price aggregates are given by: 
1
, , ( )
H
H
H t H t H hP P j dj



 
  
  
  and 
1
, , ( )
F
F
F t F t F FP P j dj



 
  
  
  
2.3.4. Retailers 
There are three groups of retailers: domestic, importing and exporting retailers, which are 
all subject to nominal rigidities a lá Calvo. 
Domestic retailers purchase undifferentiated intermediate goods from entrepreneurs, 
transform them into differentiated goods and sell them to aggregators. Each period with 
probability (1 )H  they receive a signal to reoptimize and then set the price to maximize 
expected profits. Alternatively they index the price according to: 
, 1 1 ,( ) ((1 ) ) ( )H t h H H t H t HP j P j        with  0,1H  . 
Importing retailers are symmetric to domestic retailers. We assume prices are sticky in 
domestic currency, i.e. pass-through is incomplete. Prices are reoptimized with probability 
(1 )F and indexed otherwise according to: 
, 1 1 ,( ) ((1 ) ) ( )F t h F F t F t FP j P j        
Exporting retailers purchase domestic undifferentiated goods to sell them abroad at price 
* *
, ( )H t HP j , which is expressed in foreign currency. Prices are sticky in the foreign currency too. 
The demand for exported goods is given by: 
*
*
(1 )
* *
,* * *
, ,*
,
( )
( )
H
H
H t H
H t H H t
H t
P j
y j y
P


 
 
   
 
,  
where * *( )H Hy j  is the output of the retailer and the following definitions apply: 
*
*
1
11
1* * * *
, ,
0
( )
H
H
H t H t H Hy y j dj




 
  
  

 and 
*
*
1
* * * *
, , ( )
H
H
H t H t H hP P j dj



 
  
  

. 
We assume that the demand abroad is given by: 
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*
*
(1 )
*
,* * *
, *
(1 )
H
H
H t
H t t
t
P
y y
P



 
 
    
  . 
We further assume that foreign demand, the interest rate and inflation follow exogenous 
AR(1) processes allowing for contemporaneous correlation between shocks. With probability 
*
H
 
exporting retailers cannot reoptimize their price and follow the pricing rule: 
** * * * * *
, 1 1 ,( ) ((1 ) ) ( )H t h H H t H t HP j P j      
 
2.4. Monetary Policy 
We assume a Taylor rule of the form: 
1
1
R
yR
tt t t
t
R y
R e
R y

 




     
              , 
where monetary policy systematically reacts to deviations of inflation and output from 
its equilibrium levels. 
2.5. Macroprudential Policy 
Macroprudential policy is represented by a countercyclical rule for LTV ratios on 
household loans7: 
1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ
HH H m
t mH t t tm m x     , where 
variables with hats denote deviations from steady state and x is the variable, to which 
macroprudential policy is systematically reacting. In the case of Korea it would be realistic to 
assume x to be growth of housing prices (Igan and Kang 2011) or household credit growth.  
LTV ratios of firms are evolving according to an AR(1) process in our baseline simulations: 
                                                 
7
 It is unclear, which policy rules are the best in describing macroprudential policies. Funke and Paetz (2012) suggest 
a non-linear rule reacting to housing prices, where policy reaction is triggered after a certain (fixed) threshold in the 
financial indicator is surpassed. This type of rule, however, does not fit Korean data well. We therefore study linear 
specification of LTV rules here. 
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1
ˆ ˆ
FF F m
t mH t tm m   .
 
2.6. Fiscal Policy 
The government uses lump sum taxes to finance its expenditures. Fiscal policy is 
Ricardian, governments budget constraint is given by:  
t tG T ,  
Where we assume that government expenditure follows an AR(1) process. 
2.7.  Market Clearing, Balance of Payments, GDP 
In the final goods market we have: 
, , 1( )t k t t t t t tc i i g u k y       , where 
I I P P E E
t t t tc c c c      
Market clearing in the intermediate homogenous goods market is: 
1 1
*
, , ,
0 0
( ) ( )H t H t W ty j dj y j dj y    
Clearing condition for the housing market is given by: 
1
P P I I
t t t        
Balance of payments (expressed in home currency) has the form: 
1
* *
, , 1 1 1
0
1
* * * * * *
, ,
0
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
F
H
F t F t F F t t t t
t H t H t H H t t
P j y j dj e R L
e P j y j dj e L
   
 


 
GDP is defined by: 
1 1
* * * * *
, , , ,
0 0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )t t t t t H t H H t H H F t F F t F FP y P y e P j y j dj P j y j dj     
With 
yy denoting GDP. 
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3. Calibration and Estimation 
 Most calibrated values (especially steady-state ratios to GDP) from Table 1 are based on 
the long-run averages computed for Korea and the U.S. Share of the constrained households is set 
to 0.4, which is consistent with Leif (2009), who set the share for Korea to 0.39 in “normal 
times” and to 0.5 in a “crisis scenario”. LTV ratios in steady state correspond to average values 
for Korea (Igan and Kang (2011)), home bias (share of home goods in final goods) parameter 
calibration is in line with Gertler et al. (2007). Domestic inflation target is set to 3% p.a., which is 
in line with the target of Bank of Korea. 
Parameter Value (Steady 
State) 
Parameter Value (Steady 
State) 
New Household Loans to 
GDP (flow) 
0.05 Housing Investment to 
GDP 
0.05 
New Firm Loans to GDP 
(flow) 
0.04 Exports to GDP 0.32 
Labor Income Share in GDP 0.66 Import to GDP 0.30 
Domestic Money Market 
Rate 
1.04^0.25 Share of Entrepreneurs 
in the Economy 
0.25 
Domestic Rate on Household 
Loans 
1.07^0.25 Share of Impatient 
Households in the 
Economy 
0.4 
Domestic Rate on Firm 
Loans 
1.08^0.25 Share of Patient 
Households in the 
Economy 
0.35 
LTV Households 0.5 Foreign Inflation Target 1.02^0.25 
LTV Firms 0.2 Home Bias  0.6 
Domestic Inflation Target 1.03^0.25 Foreign Money Market 
Rate 
1.035^0.25 
Absorption to GDP 0.98 External Debt to GDP 0.35 
Consumption to GDP 0.6 Investment to GDP 0.15 
Table 1. Calibrated Model Parameters and Steady State Ratios. 
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Bayesian Estimation 
The model is estimated using twelve macroeconomic quarterly time series for the period 
1999/Q1 to 2008/Q4. Time series covering the Korean economy are: real GDP, real government 
expenditure, real consumption, the real exchange rate, consumer price inflation, the money 
market interest rate, spreads between the money market rate and the household deposit rate, 
household loan rate and corporation loan rate. The data sources are Bank of Korea and OECD. 
For the foreign economy we use the following U.S. variables extracted from the FRED database: 
real GDP, consumer price index and effective Federal Funds rate. All variables are seasonally 
adjusted. National account variables are taken in logs. We transform the data into a form suitable 
for computing the likelihood function. We apply standard HP filtering procedure to detrend all 
time series. Following Adolfson et al. (2008), we estimate a structural foreign VAR separately 
and then keep these estimated values fixed during Bayesian estimation8. The VAR has the form: 
0 1( )t t tF X F L X   , where (0, )t xN   
The identification scheme follows Adolfson et al. (2008), i.e.: 
0
1 2
1 0 0
0 1 0
1
F
 
 
 
 
   
 
We choose not to exclude foreign variables as observables in Bayesian estimation as these 
data series might be useful to identify some of the parameters governing cross-country linkages9. 
Priors are chosen in accordance with existing literature (see Smets and Wouters (2007), 
Adolfson et al. (2007, 2008)), all values are listed in Table 2. Dogmatic priors are imposed on 
parameters, which are weakly identified from the data. In particular, intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution for housing is set to 4 and for consumption to 2, following Brzoza-Brzezina and 
Makarski (2011). Adjustment cost parameters for capital and housing are also set in line with 
Christiano et al. 2005. The rest of parameters are estimated with Bayesian techniques (estimates 
relating to the shock processes are given in the Appendix). 
                                                 
8
 Foreign VAR has lag order 2 (chosen according to the Schwartz criterion). 
9
 The model incorporates 10 structural shocks, 9 of them follow AR(1) processes, whereas monetary policy shock is 
assumed to be iid. To avoid stochastic singularity, we introduce two measurement errors: for GDP and real exchange 
rate series. We apply 4 Metropolis Hastings chains with one million draws in each of them discarding the first 30% 
of them as burn-in. Mode is computed with csminwel1 routine. Average acceptance rate is between 25% and 30%. 
Brooks and Gelman (1998) diagnostics indicate good convergence of chains. All diagnostics as well as plots of 
posterior distributions are available upon request. 
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Parameter 
Prior Posterior 
Type Mean St. Dev. Mode Mean 
n  
norm 4.00 0.50 3.85 3.87 
W  
beta 0.50 0.10 0.53 0.53 
H  
beta 0.50 0.10 0.33 0.34 
F  
beta 0.50 0.10 0.53 0.51 
D  
beta 0.50 0.10 0.66 0.66 
L  
beta 0.50 0.10 0.55 0.57 
*
H  
beta 0.50 0.10 0.48 0.49 
W  
beta 0.50 0.10 0.45 0.46 
H  
beta 0.50 0.10 0.45 0.45 
F  
beta 0.50 0.10 0.44 0.45 
*
H  
beta 0.50 0.10 0.52 0.51 
R  
beta 0.70 0.10 0.93 0.92 
  
norm 1.50 0.10 1.48 1.48 
y  norm 0.50 0.05 0.51 0.50 
Table 2. Prior and Posterior Distributions: Structural Parameters. 
 
4. Policy Analysis Under a Financial Shock 
As already noted in the introduction, the shocks triggering financial vulnerability for 
Korea are of external origin (such as global  financial distress and capital flow volatility, see also 
Kim 2012). Lax monetary policies around the globe might trigger capital inflows into the Korean 
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economy, making credit in this economy cheaper. Potentially, this may lead to a build-up of the 
credit boom10, which can burst once external capital goes away, leaving the borrowers highly 
indebted. Given the already high level of household indebtedness in Korea, this type of shocks 
constitutes a serious concern for both macroeconomic and financial stability and calls for 
appropriate policy responses.   The financial shock we focus on below is meant to capture these 
features. 
The financial shock in this model 
H
tLz , applies to the balance sheet of the lending bank: 
,*
, , ,( ) ( ( ) ( ))
H H H H
t L t IB t t IB tL i z L i e L i   
An expansionary financial shock implies a decrease in the spread for household loans 
(Figure 4). As borrowing costs of households decline, they increase their borrowing in absolute 
(l_h) and relative terms as a ratio to GDP (l_h_y). Consumption goes up, which eventually leads 
to a rise in GDP and inflation (pi). Real exchange rate (q) appreciates as capital is flowing into 
the home country.11 This shock therefore reflects the vulnerability of Korean banks to exogenous 
external events: for an exogenous reason (not related to domestic monetary policy) balance sheets 
of the banks grow or shrink affecting borrowing costs in the home economy. 
[insert Figure 4] 
Noteworthy, expansionary financial shock in this model moves inflation, output as well as 
household loan-to-GDP ratio in the same direction, calling for tightening of both monetary and 
macroprudential policies. In the next section we study, what the optimal policy response to this 
shock should be: if only one  or both (monetary and macroprudential) policies should respond 
respond and if there are gains from cooperation between monetary and macroprudential 
authorities.  
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 Indeed, capital inflows are one of the most typical reasons for credit booms, especially in small open economies 
(see Dell’Ariccia et al. 2012). 
11
 On Figure 4, GDP falls on impact slightly because net exports decline due to real exchange rate appreciation. 
Therefore the inflation also starts slightly below zero. These negative impact effects can be eliminated by introducing 
modified UIP condition as in Adolfson et al. (2008). The policy results (in particular, the ranking of policies) are not 
affected by the presence (absence) of modified UIP. 
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Optimal Simple Rules  
In this section we examine optimal simple rules in response to financial shock. We start 
by looking at the scenario, where macroprudential policy is passive (LTV ratio is kept at its 
steady state level) and only monetary policy reacts to the shock. Monetary authority minimizes 
the objective function: 
)ˆ(1.0)ˆ(5.0)ˆ( iVaryVarVarLMP  
12  
subject to the constraints of the economy and the policy rule of the form: 
tttytit xyyii ˆ)ˆˆ(ˆˆˆ 441     , 
where i is the annualized quarterly policy rate,  is the year-on-year inflation and y is 
quarterly output. We also study augmented Taylor rules, where the additional variable x stands 
for household credit growth, housing inflation or exchange rate. The results are presented in 
Table 3. 
 
Rule  
i    y  lH  X  e  Loss  Loss 
increase  
to best 
(%) 
standard  1,17 1,93 0,60 -  -  -  0,6313 0,01 
Augmented  rules  
HH credit 
growth  
1,19 1,49 0,45 0,01 -  -  0,6340 0,42 
housing 
inflation  
1,13 1,41 0,50 -  0,21 -  0,6312 
  
best 
exchange 
rate  
1,21 1,50 0,56 -  -  0,05 0,6334 0,33 
Table 3. Optimal Simple Rules under Active Monetary and Passive MaPP Policy13. 
                                                 
12
 The weights in the objective function are consistent with Angelini et al. (2011). 
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As we can see from Table 3, the 4-parameter rule reacting too housing inflation performs 
best, yielding the smallest loss. However, the improvement relative to the standard Taylor rule 
(which is second best) is only marginal. This result is similar to the one obtained by Iacoviello 
(2005) in a closed economy context. Credit growth rule performs slightly worse than the housing 
inflation rule, and it is also costly to react to nominal exchange rate. Noteworthy, in the case of 
credit growth and exchange rate augmented rules the reacting coefficients on these variables are 
driven by the optimization practically to zero. It is not optimal for monetary authority with a 
standard set of objectives to react to these variables. In other words, monetary policy has to 
sacrifice its standard objectives (output and inflation stabilization) when it aims at additionally 
stabilizing nominal exchange rate or credit growth. In light of this result, the question arises, 
whether active macroprudential policy can improve matters so that monetary policy does not 
have to sacrifice its standard objectives for achieving financial stability. 
 Next policy scenario assumes active macroprudential policy as represented by the 
following countercyclical LTV rule: 
tlH
H
tmH
H
t bmm
ˆˆˆ
1    ,  
where 
tbˆ  is household credit growth. The macroprudential authority minimizes the following 
loss function: 
)ˆ(1.0)ˆˆ( Httt
MaPP mVarybVarL   
subject to the above macroprudential rule and the constraints of the economy.  
There is no consensus in the literature regarding the loss function of the macroprudential 
authority. We follow Angelini et al. (2011) and Kannan, Rabanal and Scott (2009) by assuming 
that macroprudential authority minimizes the variation in household loans-to-GDP ratio.14 
                                                                                                                                                              
13
 As the objective function of the model is flat, we first did an extensive grid search over the parameter space and 
then applied the Matlab routine fmincon to find the optimal rule coefficients. In cases, where gradient-based methods 
were particularly inefficient, we also applied Nelder-Mead type algorithms (such as fminsearch). 
14
 In this model macroprudential authority can only address the time-series dimension of systemic risk, mitigating 
credit and housing cycles. In the case of Korea, this dimension of systemic risk has proven to be more important than 
cross-section systemic risk (Kim 2012). 
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Furthermore, we assume macroprudential authority minimizes the variation in changes of its 
instrument, as large changes of LTV ratios may be distortionary and costly in reality.15  
Now we implement a non-cooperative scenario between monetary and macroprudential 
authorities, where each authority takes the action of the other as given, but both policies will be 
active. In particular, it implies that monetary authority maximizes its objective function and 
chooses the parameters of the standard (non-augmented) Taylor rule ( i

, 

 and y

) taking the 
parameters of the macroprudential authority ( mH

 and lH

) as given and vice versa for 
macroprudential authority16. The results are presented in Table 4. 
Scenario 
i    y

 mH

 lH

 
Joint Loss 
Non-cooperative, 
taking the other as 
given, but active 
0,52 1,55 0,05 0,99 9,99 0,05   +  6,98      = 7,03 
(MP)    (MaPP) 
 
Table 4. Optimal Simple Rules Under Active Non-Cooperation. 
Under this scenario, monetary policy reacts much less aggressively than under the 
scenario with passive macroprudential policy and achieves a much lower loss (see first line of 
Table 3).This is, however, “compensated” by a very aggressive countercyclical macroprudential 
policy.17 The associated loss consisting of the sum of the two respective objective functions is 
displayed in the last column of Table 5. Coming back to the Korean experience, this scenario 
                                                 
15
 It is debated whether the objective function of the macroprudential authority should also include real variables 
(output growth or unemployment). In contrast to Angelini et al. (2011), we do not include output growth into the 
objective function of macroprudential authority leaving this task to monetary policy alone. 
16
 Technically, this scenario is implemented as iterative optimization between the two authorities. Starting values are 
set at standard Taylor rule (see Taylor 1993) with smoothing of 0.5 for monetary authority and as a countercyclical 
rule with smoothing 0.7 and 5.1lH for macroprudential authority. The convergence criterion is defined for 
optimal parameter values. 
17
 We set an upper bound of 10 on the credit growth reaction coefficient for macroprudential policy in all our 
exercises to rule out unrealistically high coefficients. Very aggressive coefficients on the macroprudential side 
appear to be a common feature of DSGE models of this type. This is also documented by Rabanal et al. (2011), who 
use lagged rules for macroprudential authority (i.e. reacting to lagged credit growth instead of the current credit 
growth) to obtain more realistic reaction coefficients. 
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seems to be fairly realistic, as there is no coordination mechanism between the central bank and 
the other macroprudential authorities in Korea dealing with financial stability (see Kim 2012).18 
Finally, we turn to the cooperative scenario, in which both monetary and macroprudential 
policies are active and are minimizing joint loss function: 
)ˆ(1.0)ˆˆ()ˆ(1.0)ˆ(5.0)ˆ( Htttttt
coop mVarybVariVaryVarVarL     
subject to both policy rules: 
)ˆˆ(ˆˆˆ 41   ttytit yyii    
tlH
H
tmH
H
t bmm
ˆˆˆ
1    . 
As shown in Table 5 (first row), under cooperation, macroprudential policy is no longer 
that aggressive as it was in the previous non-cooperative scenarios. Remarkably, this leads to the 
best outcomes in terms of losses. Under non-cooperative scenario (row 2 in Table 5), the balance 
between monetary and macroprudential policies is suboptimal: whereas both policies try to 
counteract the shock in a countercyclical manner, macroprudential policy does too much. Hence, 
there are substantial gains from cooperative actions of monetary and macroprudential policies19. 
This result appears intuitive: as all objectives move into the same direction and call for tightening 
of both policies under expansionary financial shock, it is optimal for the policies to react 
simultaneously and less aggressively, which also leads to lower costs. This optimal balance is 
achieved in a cooperative scenario. 
Scenario 
i  

 y

 mH

 lH

 
Joint Loss 
Cooperative, both active  0,45 0,64 0,10 0,98 4,19 5,15 
Non-cooperative, taking 
the other as given and 
active 
0,52 1,55 0,05 0,99 9,99 0,05   +  6,98      = 7,03 
(MP)    (MaPP) 
 
Table 5. Optimal Simple Rules under Cooperation and No-Cooperation Scenarios. 
                                                 
18
 Other macroprudential authorities are: Financial Service Commission and Financial Supervisory Service. 
19
 We have also studied scenarios, where monetary policy alone is in charge of the joint objective. Under both 
standard and augmented by financial indicators (credit growth and housing inflation) Taylor rules, this scenario 
yielded higher losses compared with cooperative scenario. 
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Deterministic Simulations 
In our previous (stochastic) simulations in one of the non-cooperative scenarios we had to 
assume that one of the policies stayed inactive forever. However, it is not a realistic assumption. 
In reality, monetary policy was accommodative for a few quarters, whereas macroprudential 
policy (LTV policy) was tightened. We now turn to simulations of such a scenario. In particular, 
we assume: 







 afterwardsyyii
quarter
i
ttytit
t
)ˆˆ(ˆˆˆ
610
ˆ
41  
 
Under this scenario monetary policy is accommodative (i.e. interest rate kept at its steady 
state level) in the first 6 quarters, and then monetary policy operates according to the Taylor rule. 
The choice of 6 quarters comes close to the actual duration of the accommodative monetary 
policy stance in Korea in 2009-2011, whereas 6 quarters rather represent a moderate estimate of 
monetary policy accommodation (IMF 2011). 
Technically, this scenario implies a non-linearity in the monetary policy rule, therefore we 
use deterministic algorithm of Fair and Taylor (1983) and simulate the model under anticipated 
financial shock. Macroprudential policy is active throughout the simulation. The coefficients in 
both policy rules are set according to the cooperative scenario. The Figures 5-6 below plot key 
variables under two scenarios. The first scenario (labeled “6Q”) is accommodative on the 
monetary side as described above, whereas under the alternative scenario (labeled “active MP”) 
both policies are active and set according to respective policy rules.   
[insert Figure 5] 
The main implication form the absence of active monetary policy in the first quarters of 
simulation is the surge in inflation. Output expands by more under accommodation scenario too. 
Surge in inflation has further implications for financial stability and macroprudential policy 
effectiveness. Figure 6 shows the dynamics of household and firm loans as well as 
macroprudential policy response (LTV ratio on household loans). 
[insert Figure 6] 
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As loan contracts are set in nominal terms, the debt-deflation mechanism embedded in the 
collateral constraint is at work here. Under accommodative scenario, impatient households will 
be able to borrow more due to surge in inflation. Therefore macroprudential policy has to react 
stronger under this scenario: LTV ratio for households has to be lowered by more. Furthermore, 
as household LTV is applied only locally, it does not affect the costs of borrowing for the firms, 
which due to the debt-deflation argument are able to borrow more. Monetary accommodation 
therefore creates a credit boom in other sectors of the economy, which are not covered by the 
narrow macroprudential policy measures.20 This example illustrates that macroprudential policy 
should not be regarded as a substitute for monetary policy. Prolonged monetary accommodation 
under this scenario appears costly and suboptimal in terms of both price and financial stability. 
5. Further Analysis and Robustness (in progress) 
The robustness of the analysis has to be done along the following dimensions. First of all, 
the objective function for both authorities is ad hoc and not microfounded. Therefore it is 
necessary to use alternative weighting schemes and (ideally) to perform Ramsey policy analysis. 
In the latter case, it would be of interest to consider welfare approximations of utility functions of 
heterogeneous agents (both types of consumers as well as entrepreneurs); a promising way of 
aggregating them is outlined in Bilbiie et al. (2012).  
Second, optimal policies to other shocks should be investigated. Of particular interest are 
shocks leading to the goal conflict between macroprudential and monetary authorities. Such cases 
might give rise to the “push-me-pull-you” game between the authorities. 
Finally, it is clearly not a realistic assumption that the borrowing constraint is binding at 
all times, especially when we consider large financial shocks (“eternally binding borrowing 
constraint”). We are currently incorporating an occasionally binding borrowing constraint using 
the algorithm of Holden and Paetz (2012), which is appears to be applicable to the models of this 
                                                 
20
 All of the described effects certainly become more pronounced, the longer monetary policy stays accommodative 
and the lower the interest rate is, to which central bank sticks for several quarters. In this simulation the interest rate 
in steady state (used in our simulations) is set to Korean historical average of 4% p.a., whereas the actual interest rate 
during 2009-2011 accommodation was even lower. 
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size. This allows us to study asymmetries and appropriate policy responses under positive and 
negative financial shocks.  
 
5. Short Summary 
We estimated model for Korean economy with distinct roles for monetary and 
macroprudential policy and studied optimal policy responses in the face of an expansionary 
financial shock, that improves the wholesale financing conditions of the banks and therefore 
lowers the spreads of the household loans. Our results show that cooperation between monetary 
and macroprudential policies are optimal in this case. Monetary accommodation in periods of 
macroprudential tightening leads to inflationary pressures, lowers MaPP effectiveness and 
contributes to potentially higher vulnerabilities in other sectors of the economy. Our analysis 
shows that under financial shock, monetary and macroprudential policies should work hand in 
hand and should not be regarded as substitutes. 
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Figures 
Figure 1 
 
  
Figures 1a (left panel) and 1b (right panel).  
1a: Unsold Residential Property and Mortgage Lending in Korea. 
1b: Household Debt to Disposable Income. 
Source: IMF Article IV on Korea (2012). 
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Figure 2 
 
Figures 2a (left panel) and 2b (right panel).  
2a: Stock of Consolidated Foreign Claims of Korean Banks to Foreign Banks. 
2b: Consolidated Foreign Claims of European and U.S. Banks on Selected Asian 
Economies. 
Source: IMF Article IV on Korea (2012). 
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Figure 3 
 
Figure 3. Real Policy Rate in Korea: January 2006 – May 2012. 
Source: IMF Article IV on Korea (2012). 
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Figure 4 
 
 
Figure 4. Effects of an Expansionary Financial Shock (decrease in spreads on household 
loans) 
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Figures 5 and 6 
 
Figure 5. Inflation and GDP under Deterministic Scenarios. 
 
 
Figure 6. Household Loans, LTV on Household Loans, and Firm Loans Under 
Deterministic Scenarios. 
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Appendix: Prior and Posterior Distributions: Shocks 
 
Parameter 
Prior Posterior 
Type Mean St. Dev. Mode Mean 
c  beta 0.70 0.10 0.61 0.66 
A  beta 0.70 0.10 0.51 0.51 
  beta 0.70 0.10 0.48 0.47 
g  beta 0.70 0.10 0.59 0.59 
hm
  beta 0.70 0.05 0.70 0.70 
fm
  beta 0.70 0.05 0.71 0.70 
h
dz
  beta 0.70 0.10 0.64 0.63 
h
lz
  beta 0.70 0.10 0.50 0.50 
f
lz
  beta 0.70 0.10 0.49 0.49 
c  invg 0.05 Inf 0.075 0.049 
A  invg 0.05 Inf 0.014 0.014 
  invg 0.05 Inf 0.011 0.012 
R  invg 0.01 Inf 0.001 0.002 
g  invg 0.01 Inf 0.012 0.012 
hm
  invg 0.10 Inf 0.042 0.064 
fm
  invg 0.10 Inf 0.047 0.308 
h
dz
  invg 0.01 Inf 0.004 0.004 
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h
lz
  invg 0.01 Inf 0.003 0.003 
f
lz
  invg 0.01 Inf 0.005 0.006 
obsq
  invg 0.01 Inf 0.074 0.077 
obs
gdp  invg 0.01 Inf 0.004 0.004 
 
 
